Difference between revisions of "Design principles"
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''Ostrom attempts to identify common features of societies and institutions that promoted their efficacy and survival. She enumerates these "Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring CPR institutions" as follows.<ref>This list appears in her 1990 book [19] (page 90) and also in her Journal of Economic Perspectives article [21].</ref>'' | ''Ostrom attempts to identify common features of societies and institutions that promoted their efficacy and survival. She enumerates these "Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring CPR institutions" as follows.<ref>This list appears in her 1990 book [19] (page 90) and also in her Journal of Economic Perspectives article [21].</ref>'' | ||
# Clearly defined boundaries, defining who can withdraw common re-sources and who cannot. This feature makes the resources | # Clearly defined boundaries, defining who can withdraw common re-sources and who cannot. This feature makes the resources ”common property” of insiders but does not allow “open access” to outsiders. | ||
# Appropriation rules that restrict time, place, technology, and/or | # Appropriation rules that restrict time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resources withdrawn, where these rules are tailored to local conditions. | ||
# Collective choice rules that allow most individuals affected by rules | # Collective choice rules that allow most individuals affected by rules to participate in any modification of these rules. | ||
# Monitoring of compliance, where the monitors are accountable to | # Monitoring of compliance, where the monitors are accountable to the local resource appropriators. Self-enforcement by group members is a critical feature of most successful solutions. Usually this works better than attempts to enforce rules passed by a an outside government that is ill-equipped to enforce these rules. | ||
# Graduated sanctions for non-compliance, where the severity of | # Graduated sanctions for non-compliance, where the severity of sanctions depend on the severity and context of the offense. | ||
# Access to rapid, low-cost arenas to resolve conflict among uses | # Access to rapid, low-cost arenas to resolve conflict among uses and between users and officials. | ||
# Minimal recognition of the right to organize by a national or | # Minimal recognition of the right to organize by a national or local government. | ||
# For larger common pools, the presence of governance activities | # For larger common pools, the presence of governance activities organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. | ||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
<references/> | <references/> |
Revision as of 23:27, 16 February 2015
Various articulations of "design principles" for a commons, hopefully inspirational to others:
Elinor Ostrom
From Ted Bergstrom:
Ostrom attempts to identify common features of societies and institutions that promoted their efficacy and survival. She enumerates these "Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring CPR institutions" as follows.[1]
- Clearly defined boundaries, defining who can withdraw common re-sources and who cannot. This feature makes the resources ”common property” of insiders but does not allow “open access” to outsiders.
- Appropriation rules that restrict time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resources withdrawn, where these rules are tailored to local conditions.
- Collective choice rules that allow most individuals affected by rules to participate in any modification of these rules.
- Monitoring of compliance, where the monitors are accountable to the local resource appropriators. Self-enforcement by group members is a critical feature of most successful solutions. Usually this works better than attempts to enforce rules passed by a an outside government that is ill-equipped to enforce these rules.
- Graduated sanctions for non-compliance, where the severity of sanctions depend on the severity and context of the offense.
- Access to rapid, low-cost arenas to resolve conflict among uses and between users and officials.
- Minimal recognition of the right to organize by a national or local government.
- For larger common pools, the presence of governance activities organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.
Notes
- ↑ This list appears in her 1990 book [19] (page 90) and also in her Journal of Economic Perspectives article [21].